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I. Introduction 
While during 1990-1992, Hungary was generally considered to have been in the best 
macroeconomic position among East-European transition economies and was regarded to have 
had the best and closest prospects for becoming a market economy, in 1993 increasing disillusion 
and scepticism can be observed on the part of foreign analysts concerning this country`s political, 
economic performance and outlook. This is partly explained by the disappointing external 
economic performance of the country in 1993. The paper concentrates on economic 
developments; it does not treat issues related to domestic and foreign policy. It may well be the 
case that in the latter fields the trends are not encouraging, but these problems are beyond the 
focus of our paper. One of the major points we wish to demonstrate is that in spite of the clearly 
unfavourable recent economic developments, it would be too early to attribute Hungary`s present 
economic problems to its specific - "non-shock" - approach to the transition. Economic 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy has no precedents and 
experience clearly indicates that almost all respective predictions turned out to be unfounded. 
The transition seems to be an extremely difficult process, involving heavy economic and social 
costs. Temporary successes may be followed by lengthy set-backs. This is not to say that without 
political and economic transformation countries of the region would be better off; it only implies 
that as yet there are no solid grounds for forming strong judgements on the observed 
performance or the strategies pursued by individual countries.  
This paper discusses some of the major macroeconomic issues related to economic 
transition in Hungary and touches certain points related to comparison with other countries of 
the region. The first section treats the economic legacy of the democratically elected Hungarian 
government. The second deals with the initial policy-dilemma: shock-therapy or gradual 
changes. The major macroeconomic developments and policy issues of 1991-1992 are covered 
in section three. The fourth section deals with the major challenges facing the country in and 
after 1993. As a conclusion, the outlook of the Hungarian economy is discussed, comparisons 
with other countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) are drawn and some lessons of the 
Hungarian experience are spelled out. 
It should be emphasized that the present survey does not cover the specific issues related 
to privatization in Hungary and in other CEE countries. This is explained by two reasons. First, 
the (English language) literature on the Hungarian transition and those of other CEE economies 
is saturated with publications on privatization; there is very little one can add to the already 
existing, vast amount of information.1 Second, and more importantly, those issues of 
macroeconomic policy that this study wishes to treat are not related directly to the problems of 
privatization. To put it more strongly, the over-discussed and over-politicised question of 
privatization is not considered to be a fundamental issue from the point of view of short-term 
macroeconomic management by the authors. The latter questions are covered only in the context 
of macroeconomic policies in this paper. 
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II. Economic Legacies of the Democratic Hungarian Government  
Formally speaking, that is, in the legal and political sense, the beginning of Hungary`s 
transition towards a market economy can be dated back to 1990, the time of the election of the 
first democratic government after 45 years. This country`s transition, however, represents a 
special case among the transition stories of countries in Central-Eastern Europe. This is 
explained by several reasons. First, the democratically elected Hungarian government inherited a 
relatively stable and significantly reformed economy, at least compared with other countries of 
the region. Second, partly as a result of the previous domestic reforms and the relative domestic 
macroeconomic equilibrium of the country, the new democratic government did not, and as we 
shall argue, did not have to, aim at any kind of shock approach to economic transformation. 
Third, the new government inherited an unusually large external debt, but it also inherited 
creditworthiness, i.e. the country at all times fulfilled its debt service obligations. Forth, the 
economy was integrated into the international economy to a larger degree than other CEE 
countries, which is shown by e.g. the higher share of trade with the OECD region and is also 
indicated by the fact that Hungary was the first among CEE countries to launch a trade 
liberalization programme in 1989. 
In the following we elaborate on the above points and give a brief description of the 
macroeconomic and institutional conditions of the Hungarian economy inherited by the 
democratic government in 1990. 
A. Macroeconomic Conditions  
1990 was a year following several years of continuous stagnation or minimal growth of the 
GDP. As a matter of fact, one of the major economic causes of the demise of the "pre-
democratic" regime was that during the 1980`s it was no longer able to "deliver" what it 
promised: economic growth. An important characteristic of the regime - at least according to its 
ideology and promises - was supposed to have been that it has a higher growth-potential than 
market economies. The 1980`s clearly proved that this was not the case. Although in 1987 the 
GDP grew by 4 % (the highest in the 80`s), this was preceded by very low growth rates in the 
first part of the decade and was followed by two years of stagnation (-0.2 %) and by a significant 
decline (-4.3 %) in 1990.  
At the same time consumer prices were rising rapidly - at least compared with former 
Hungarian standards. Until 1987, the rate of growth of consumer prices was below or close to 
5%. By 1987 however, inflation was already around 8.5 %, it jumped to 17% in 1989, and reached 
almost 30 % in 1990. The rapid further increase in inflation was a serious danger.  
But clearly, the most significant macroeconomic problems and dangers were related to the 
external balance of the economy. This had two components, a stock and a flow element. As far 
as the stock was concerned, the huge foreign indebtedness of the country, approximately 21.5 
billion USD (or 75 % of the GDP), certainly entailed a serious burden, namely the financing of 
the debt service. But this stock-problem was coupled with a flow-type difficulty: the very 
significant deterioration of the current account in 1989. This was partly the consequence of a 
large deterioration of the balance on tourist accounts. The reason for this huge deficit was a 
simple policy mistake. The late communist governments, attempting to take economic policy 
measures that increased their popularity, liberalized the official quotas for the households to buy 
(and spend abroad) foreign exchange. This turned out to have been a premature decision. It was 
made before implementing the liberalization of imports of consumer goods and without 
imposing the already existing value added tax on so-called "private imports", i.e. consumer goods   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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brought in the country by citizens. As a result, there was a surge in household spending on 
consumer goods abroad, which showed up as a deterioration of net revenues in the tourist 
account of more than 0.7 billion dollars in two years (1988-89). This serious problem was 
increased by the fact that in early 1990 there was a run on the country`s international reserves - 
several foreign banks and other institutions withdrew their deposits from the National Bank of 
Hungary (NBH). In early 1990, the level of international reserves was extremely low and the 
country was very close to bankruptcy (insolvency). At that time it was mainly due to the activity 
of international organizations (the BIS, and more importantly, the World Bank and the IMF, as 
well as the assistance of the G-7) that Hungary managed to maintain its solvency2. 
At the beginning of political and economic transformation, neither unemployment, nor 
fiscal deficits meant serious problems for macroeconomic policy. In 1989, the rate of 
unemployment was 0.2 % and by 1990 it increased to 1.6 %. The fiscal deficit was very low in 
both absolute and relative terms; in 1988 it was 1.4 % , in 1989 1.7 % relative to GDP and in 
1990 there was practically no deficit at all. In the late 80`s and in 1990 there was certainly no 
indication that the state of public finances would become the  major source of further 
macroeconomic difficulties. 
To sum up, the macroeconomic legacy inherited in 1990 by the democratically elected 
Hungarian government was a mixed one: it inherited parly favorable microeconomic conditions 
and a very mixed macroeconomic situation. But what was the perspective of, and the 
interpretation of the situation given by, the new government itself? On the one hand, it seemed 
to have clearly realized that, unlike several other East European democratically elected 
governments, it inhered a significantly reformed economy, in which private enterprise already had 
a role. Inflation was creeping up steadily, though there was no danger of hyperinflation. 
Moreover, there was no need in Hungary, as there may have been in other countries of the 
region, to artificially create excessive price adjustment, since there was no significant monetary 
overhang (forced savings of the households). Thus, one of the tasks of the new government was 
to try to decrease the rate of inflation. Real activity was declining, but the reasons for the 
recession at that time seemed to be related either to exogenous factors (the drastic fall of exports 
to the CMEA region) or was considered to be the inevitable cost of the transformation. The most 
serious problem was considered to be the deteriorating external financial position of the country. 
Thus, the new government, beside stopping the acceleration of inflation, regarded balancing 
external payments and re-establishing the reputation of Hungary as a solvent creditor as the top 
priority. 
B. Institutional Conditions 
As mentioned above, the institutional and microeconomic conditions of the Hungarian 
economy were rather different from those of other CEE countries in 1990. Important steps had 
already been made in terms of price liberalization and removal of subsidies. The system of 
taxation had also been changed by 1990: the value-added tax and the personal income tax had 
been introduced in 1988. Progress had been made in establishing the legal framework for the 
private and small enterpreneurship. By the separation of the functions of the central bank and 
those of commercial banks, the grounds for a two-tier banking system had been laid in 1987. 
Beside these steps, and especially importantly, the liberalization and demonopolization of foreign 
trade had begun in 1989. 
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Let us take a brief look at these aspects of the transformation prior to 1990. As for price 
liberalization, by 1990 roughly 90 % of prices had been liberalized; the share of subsidises in 
government expenditures were below 10%.3. The character of the tax system was similar to 
Western countries: the VAT and the personal income tax had been introduced. Thus, in contrast 
with the tax system having characterised other CEE countries, in Hungary the tax base did not 
consist only of the profits of enterprise sector. In terms of establishing the legal framework for 
private enterprise and transforming state property into corporate ownership, the major part of 
the legislative work had already been done.  
Trade liberalization and the breaking up of the monopolization of foreign trade requires 
special attention. In the traditional model of centrally planned economies (CPE-s) foreign trade 
was extremely monopolised and very closely controlled. In this respect the Hungarian system 
broke with the traditional model during the 1980`s in small steps. It first established the right to 
conduct foreign trade operations - without involving the traditional monopolistic foreign trade 
organizations - for many of the actual manufacturing (producing) companies, but the number of 
these companies was relatively small in the first part of the 80`s. The scope of direct foreign 
trading rights was gradually increased, and by 1990 almost all companies could directly conduct 
foreign trade operations. The other aspect of reforms in foreign trade was related to liberalising, 
or more precisely, de-licencing of previously controlled imports. 
The story of import-liberalization in Hungary is an interesting one. Although we cannot get 
involved in the details, it may be useful to go beyond the general framework and say more on this 
point, rather than just present the outline of this scheme. In Hungary, just as in other former 
CPE-s, imports were strictly controlled. The restriction of imports was not based on a formal 
system of quantitative restrictions. It was informal and based on individual licensing procedures. 
The controls were supposed to have become effective (more or less strict), depending on the 
balance of payments situation of the country. As a matter of fact, the regime turned out to be 
rather ineffective in controlling the total volume of imports, but it did make life difficult for 
individual importers. 
In 1989, a large scale import-liberalization programme was launched in Hungary. The 
programme, fully justified by economic logic, was implemented under the pressure of 
international organizations (the IMF and the World Bank), but without the precise understanding 
by these organizations, of how the actual import regime worked in Hungary before 1989. The 
program of import-liberalization consisted of a three-to-four year plan aimed at the progressive 
withdrawal of the licensing procedure for imports. In the first year mainly non-competive 
productive inputs were placed on the liberalized list, but this was to be, and actually was, followed 
by the successive liberalization of competitive imports. 
Import liberalization in Hungary involved a fundamental paradox. This derived from the 
fact that Hungary, a member of the GATT since 1973, never acknowledged that it applied 
controls for imports. Just on the contrary: according to the official version (presented to foreign 
governments and international organizations) the Hungarian import regime was totally liberal, 
consisting only of tariffs and a quota on imports of consumer goods. This presentation, to say 
the least, was rather inaccurate. Hungary`s foreign partners evidently knew this, but during the 
1970`s and 80`s (when Hungary was the only reforming country in the Eastern Block), they had 
no interest in embarrassing the Hungarian government by openly discussing this issue. Thus, 
ironically, Hungary`s trade liberalization meant the removal of such controls that did not formally 
exist. The Hungarian government seems to have chosen the wrong tactics in this situation. It 
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could have admitted that it had presented an inaccurate depiction of the trade regime - that is, 
acknowledging that the system was not liberal, but it wished to liberalize it4. Had the government 
done so, it could have justified the temporary "tariffication" of the existing informal restrictions. 
Instead, it started the actual liberalization, i.e  discontinuation of the licensing for about 30 % of 
imports unilaterally and almost in secret. 
However, by maintaining the fiction of an open trade regime, the country was unable to 
temporarily replace the non- market type protection with market conform measures, namely with 
the provisional increase of tariffs of the product groups that were placed on the liberalized list. 
Thus, in 1989 Hungary effectively began to remove the quantitative restrictions on imports, 
without any kind of compensating measures. The possible compensating steps that could have 
been taken were either temporary increases in tariff rates in order to countervail the removal of 
former informal protection or a real devaluation of the exchange rate. Neither of the two, or any 
of their combination, had been taken, and it seems to be the case that one of the major sources 
of the present problems are related to the misunderstandings related to, and inadequate treatment 
of, trade liberalisation. 
In conclusion it is fair to state that the democratically elected Hungarian government 
inherited an economy that was already on its way toward a market economy. It also inherited 
both serious macroeconomic problems and the consequences of policy mistakes, but on balance, 
its legacy easily qualifies as the best among the CEE transition economies.  
 
III. The Initial Policy Dilemma: Shock Therapy or Gradual 
Change? 
In 1990, at the time of the democratic elections in Hungary, the shock-approach to 
economic transformation was the ruling paradigm in "Transition Economics", the emerging new 
economic discipline. This was mainly due to the international reputation earned by the boldness 
of the stabilization experiment in Poland in early 1990. An international consensus seemed to 
have emerged, according to which the transition to a market economy necessarily involved 
shock-type measures. The notion of a shock-solution had its proponents in Hungary as well, 
though they were in clear minority.  
Since the notion of the "shock therapy" is used more often than defined, it should be 
useful to clarify three issues at this point. First, what is the actual meaning of shock therapy 
proper? Second, what are the conditions under which this therapy can be implemented? Third, 
what was the relevance of this idea in Hungary in 1990, and who and for what reasons supported 
it? 
"Shock therapy" has become associated with a number of quite different policy measures. 
On the one hand, this term has been used to describe radical stabilization measures, aimed at 
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stopping hyperinflations or an otherwise uncontrolable deterioration of the balance-of-payments. 
On the other hand, the notion of shock therapy has also become associated with radical changes 
in the institutional framework of the economy. The reason why the two interpretations came to 
be mixed up is that in Poland, the first experimental country in CEE for the shock approach, the 
two distinct elements, macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization, were implemented at the 
same time. But without making a clear difference between the two, serious misunderstandings 
may emerge. 
The shock approach to stabilization of a hyperinflation has indeed several arguments on its 
side. Hyperinflation cannot be stopped gradually; it needs to arrested in one step. But in Central 
and Eastern Europe the task consisted and still consists of much more than stabilization proper; 
it involves systemic transformation as well. What took place in Poland in 1990 was the 
stabilization of extremely high inflation coupled with a very radical systemic reform. The latter 
aspect of the "therapy" was associated with the immediate opening up of the economy, i.e. 
introducing the so called internal convertibility of the Polish currency. Thus, in CEE shock 
therapy came to be known as the combination of measures aimed at simultaneous 
macroeconomic stabilization and radical liberalization of the economy. 
Let us now turn to the relevance of a Polish-type shock approach to economic 
transformation in Hungary. There were serval influential domestic proponents of this approach, 
including economists of high international reputation5 and the first Minister of Finance6 of the 
democratic government. 
What are the conditions under which this particular combination of policy measures are 
justified? In my view, there are no such conditions. To be sure, high inflation has to be stopped 
and the institutions of a market economy have to be implemented in CEE, but there are no clear 
economic reasons to do these simultaneously, and even less for doing the latter in one single step. 
One of the reasons for the deep economic recession that followed the economic stabilization-
cum reform measures in Poland seems to be that the inevitable stabilization measures were 
combined with the immediate trade liberalization of an extremely closed economy7. The latter 
was the major component of radical systemic reforms. 
In spite of the consensus against radical changes, not just the above-mentioned Hungarian 
experts, but also some of the political parties supported a kind of a shock approach to economic 
changes in Hungary as well. It was mainly The Alliance of Free Democrats (the largest opposition 
party after the elections) that primarily supported this approach. But what was the actual content 
of the Hungarian version of the case for "shock therapy"? There were two different arguments 
and lings of thought presented on this point. One was related to the possibility of eliminating 
inflation by one stroke; this was Kornai`s idea.8 The other was immediate and total liberalization 
of imports and the introduction of currency convertibility9. There was a third one as well, 
supported mainly by Ferenc Rabár, that aimed at both the quick removal of all domestic subsidies 
and the implementation of total liberalization of imports for companies. 
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These ideas met a rather strong professional opposition; they could not really be defended 
in Hungary. To begin with the last one, it was clear to almost all representatives of the profession 
that the idea was not really practical, and that it emerged from a textbook interpretation of the 
real economy. According to this interpretation, all you have to do is put prices right and things 
will take care of themselves. This idea could not be taken seriously. But there were the other two 
arguments for shock therapy as well: first, stopping inflation and second, instant liberalization 
(convertibility). 
As for immediately stopping or even promptly bringing down to single digit level of the 
existing 30% inflation rate, this was not considered to be a realistic option by the majority of 
experts. What was regarded to be feasible was the decrease of the inflation rate, what actually 
happened in 1992 (to 23%), after a temporary increase to 35% in 1992. But the other argument, 
introducing immediate (internal) convertibility, certainly had an appeal. Not only because Poland 
managed to introduce it, but also because it seemed to have a popular attraction. "Though we 
cannot do much, we can give you a convertible currency" - this was the idea behind the proposal. 
However, the latter recommendation was also rejected by most economists in Hungary and 
mainly on two grounds. First, because it would have meant a departure from the already 
prevailing policy of "gradual" import-liberalization, which, as already mentioned, and as discussed 
below, was actually rather radical in international comparison. Second, given the possibility for 
households to place their foreign exchange holdings with Hungarian commercial banks on legal 
foreign exchange accounts and, moreover, given their legal right to withdraw and carry out of the 
country any sum of foreign exchange from these accounts, the implementation of convertibility 
for the household sector involved serious risks. These risks included the possibility of conducting 
capital transactions - implying the chance of a capital flight - through the channel of "tourist 
payments" in the balance of payments. The latter risks could have been avoided only by a drastic 
devaluation of the domestic currency. It was exactly this drastic devaluation that was implied by 
the proponents, and explicitly rejected by the opponents, of an immediate (shock-type) 
implementation of convertibility in Hungary. To be sure: the proponents never spelled out clearly 
the implications of their proposal. It were the opponents who pointed out that immediate 
convertibility may either lead to a non-sustainable fall of foreign reserves or to the suspension of 
convertibility. As the latter solution would have been detrimental for any further attempts aimed 
at introducing convertibility, the feasible solution would have turned out to be the drastic 
devaluation, with all of its negative effects on real production and inflation.10 
It may be interesting to note that representatives of the IMF were also sceptical about 
immediate convertibility and the relevance of any kind of shock therapy in Hungary. This was 
revealed by the fact that when the minister of finance, referred to above, invited a mission to give 
advice on whether or not the immediate introduction of convertibility was rational and/or 
feasible, the head of the IMF mission, (as indicated by interviews given to the press) 11, rejected 
the question. After having discused the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of convertibility, 
he almost plainly stated that this was non of the IMF`s business; it was an issue to be decided by 
the Hungarian government. It should be remembered that this happened in 1990, at a time when 
the notion of "shock therapy" was in vogue, and IMF experts publicised this notion wherever 
they went in Central- Eastern Europe. 
The last observation proves that there was a very wide consensus around the desirability 
and feasibility of a gradual transformation in Hungary - so wide that, implicitly, it even included 
the IMF, an international institution that certainly had different thoughts concerning the other 
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countries of CEE. The elections in 1990 were won by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the 
party that, throughout its campaign, argued that it supports gradual changes in the economy. As a 
result, there was no shock therapy in Hungary. However, to many observers it is still not clear, 
and, as time goes by, perhaps less and less clear, whether the refusal of the shock approach was 
for the better or the worse in this country. 
In what follows, although not directly, it is this question that we wish to address. We 
cannot hope to give a definitive reply, but we certainly can present an overview and an 
interpretation of those macroeconomic developments and policy issues that may have a bearing 
on the answer. 
IV. Economic policy and macroeconomic performance during 
1990-1992 
In the period 1990-1992, the Hungarian economy underwent fundamental macroeconomic 
changes. It would be too early to decide which of these were due to exogenous, and which of 
them were related to endogenous (policy-induced) factors, respectively. We shall try to present 
the facts on the one hand, and describe their possible explanations, on the other. In what follows 
we first provide some of the essential information on macroeconomic developments in Hungary 
in the period under survey. This is followed by an interpretation of the events, involving the 
attempt to separate policy-related issues from those that are unrelated to actions of economic 
policy. 
A. Macroeconomic Developments 
From the point of view of macroeconomic developments, the period 1990-92 is 
characterised by the following significant shifts compared to the conditions prevailing in the late 
1980`s:  
1) The country sank into a deep recession with unemployment increasing at an 
unprecedented rate and reaching levels that formerly would have been considered intolerable;  
2) The foreign trade and payments position of the country improved, in spite of the almost 
total collapse of exports to the former CMEA area (former socialist countries);  
3) The deficit of the public sector soared at an extraordinary speed, reaching about 7 % of 
the GDP in 1992;  
4) Household savings also increased very rapidly, growing from 7.5 % of personal incomes 
in 1990, to above 18 % in 1992. 5) After some further increase in 1991, the rate of inflation 
decelerated significantly, to 23 % in 1992.  
In our view, these developments are closely interrelated. The positive shifts (e.g. 
improvements in the external sector, disinflation) had their negative counterparts (economic 
recession, increase in unemployment). As a result, the sharp deterioration of the internal (fiscal) 
balance and the progress in establishing external balance are two sides of the same coin. Since 
this interpretation of recent macroeconomic developments in Hungary is far from being 
universally accepted, the above statement needs to be proved. We shall try to do this by 
examining the five listed macroeconomic shifts and analysing their interrelationships.   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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1) Recession.  
The 4% drop of the GDP in 1990 was followed by a decline of 10% and 5%, in 1991 and 
1992, respectively, resulting in an increase of the rate of unemployment from 1.6% in 1990 to 7.5 
in 1991, and than to 12.5% in 1992. What were the factors contributing to these trends?  
Indisputably, the almost total collapse of the country`s Eastern trade in 1991, leading to an 
estimated 45% fall in the volume of exports to the former socialist countries, was an 
unprecedented macroeconomic blow for Hungary. Some experts12 attribute the whole drop in 
GDP to this particular shock, but this explanation of the recession involves a significant over-
simplification. However, before turning to the other possible reasons, a brief explanation of the 
trade collapse among East-European countries is in order. This is useful because some other 
scholars almost totally deny the negative impact of the Eastern trade collapse on the 
macroeconomic performance of the countries concerned13.  
Generally speaking, from the point of view of individual countries participating in the 
CMEA (an institution that ceased to exist in 1991), there were two major reasons for the radical 
decline in interregional trade. First, the switch-over from a special clearing payments system 
(accounted in "transferable roubles") to the normal, internationally accepted standards, i.e. to 
payments in convertible currencies. Second, the extreme economic decline of the USSR (to have 
become the CIS), coupled with its practical insolvency in convertible currencies. These two 
factors, combined with the more or less radical liberalization of Western imports in the countries 
of the region (resulting in a shift of import-demand toward Western sources), lead to a drastic fall 
in trade among the countries that used to belong to the CMEA. There were some other causes as 
well, moreover, the above factors could be split into several "sub-factors", but for the purposes 
of the present analysis, it is suffice to consider these general reasons of the trade decline and its 
unfavourable impact on the macroeconomic performance of Hungary and other transition 
countries of CEE. 
However, as emphasized, we do not consider the collapse of Eastern trade in itself a 
satisfactory explanation of the domestic recession. Other factors were also at work, of which we 
tried to single out the non-policy related components. But this, as it should immediately become 
clear, is practically impossible. The other general reason of the recession is "economic 
transformation"; but this is not the result of natural or endogenous developments. 
Transformation means policy measures: the state does things it formerly did not do, and at the 
same time it stops performing certain tasks it fulfilled until the transformation. Although there 
are certain aspects of economic policy under the transition that do not derive from the 
transformation proper (e.g. monetary, exchange rate or trade policy), but still: most of what we 
consider as the consequence of transition is directly related to policy measures intended to foster 
economic change. As a result, the division of the factors between those related to policy and 
those related to transformation is somewhat arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, it may be safely stated that the essence of economic transformation involves 
that inefficient, value-subtracting or expressly unproductive activities should decline, and - if all 
goes well - resources are to be shifted towards productive, internationally competitive and 
efficient activities. But even if everything goes well and there are no coordination problems (e.g. 
the capital market and the banking system exist, and, moreover, they function effectively), there 
are inevitable lags between the decline of inefficient, and the growth of efficient activities. This in 
itself should lead to the decline of overall economic activity. But, as a matter of fact, in most of 
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the transition economies, the basic institutions of the market economy do not even exist, and 
where they do, at least in some elementary form do (as in Hungary), they are not likely to work 
effectively. And since the implementation of new institutions and the transformation of existing 
ones is a lengthy process, the decline of output, at least in the early stages of transition it is more 
or less inevitable. 
However, the decline of inefficient activities is often related, either directly or indirectly, to 
the activity of the state. The channel through which the latter factor worked (and still works) is 
the removal of, or sharp cuts in, subsidises involving substantial changes in relative prices, 
accompanied by the drop of real demand and/or supply. If producer subsidises are removed, the 
company may try to raise prices, but - due to import liberalization - this is not as simple as 
previously; activities becoming unprofitable may have to be cut. If consumer subsidises are 
removed, prices go up, real demand decreases and contributes to the fall of output. There were 
other reasons contributing to the output decline as well; we shall return to these when discussing 
the issues of economic policy. 
2) External Performance and the Balance-of-Payments 
The recession of the domestic economy was accompanied by a surprisingly favourable 
external trade and payments performance, as well as a remarkable improvement in the country`s 
credit-rating in international markets. 
Trade performance was considered to have been surprisingly favourable for two reasons. 
On the one hand, in spite of the large drop in exports to the East, the significant (roughly 28 %) 
deterioration in the terms of trade with former Eastern partners and despite the fact that energy 
imports from the former USSR had to be paid for in convertible currencies, the deficit of the 
trade balance (USD 1.1 billion) was smaller than expected. On the other hand, a remarkably rapid 
reorientation of former Eastern exports towards the West could be observed. While the volume 
of exports to the East, as already mentioned, fell by about 45 %, the volume of exports towards 
developed and developing countries increased by almost 20 %. 
These trends in trade flows coincided with even more favourable developments in the 
external payments performance. The current account, after a significant improvement in 1990 
(from a deficit of 1.4 billion USD in 1989, to a surplus of 0.13 USD billion) continued to 
improve in 1991 (+0.27 billion), despite the deterioration of the commodity trade balance. This 
further improvement was due to several factors. First, the trade balance recorded in the balance-
of-payments worsened much less than the one based on customs statistics, partly because the 
capital inflow in kind (in physical form, i.e imports) is not recorded in the payments statistics. 
Second, the balance on invisible trade improved. Third, net interest payments fell somewhat and 
the surplus of "unrequited transfers" - mostly increments on the foreign exchange account of 
households - also grew. But the basic balance (that includes capital transactions) improved even 
more than the current account, mainly because of the significant inflow of foreign capital (FDI - 
foreign direct investment). In 1990, the inflow of FDI was 0.3 billion and this increased to almost 1.6 
billion USD by 1991.  
Al in all, the international debt position of the country - measured by net debt, i.e. gross 
foreign debt minus foreign assets - displayed a remarkable improvement in the period 1990-92. 
Net foreign debt, having reached almost 16 billion USD in 1990, fell to 14.5 billion in 1991, and 
to 13.1 in 1992. The decrease in net foreign debt is mainly explained by the growth of 
international reserves; gross debt did not change significantly.   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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Thus, the foreign sector, somewhat surprisingly, turned out to be the most successful part 
of the economy. What are the reasons of this success? In our view the most important part of the 
explanation is related to the recession in the economy, though some of the economic policy 
measures taken in this period - i.e. strict monetary policy - also contributed to the results. (But the 
latter, in turn, as we shall return to this point, may also have contributed to the recession). 
Changes in the political environment (inducing FDI inflow) had a role as well. The way the 
recession could help in improving the external performance was the following. On the one hand, 
companies, having lost their domestic (and Eastern) markets had simply no other choice than 
increase their exports to the West, even if these exports were not profitable in the long run. On 
the other hand, the increase of imports to be paid in hard currency (dollars), resulting from both 
the switch-over to dollar payments in Eastern trade, and from the liberalization of imports, would 
have been much more significant, had the recession not deepened in 1991. 
The improvement in the external accounts continued in 1992, though at a significantly 
decreased speed. The last months of 1992, however, turned out to be rather disappointing. The 
unfavourable external performance continued in early 1993. Whether this is due to a change in 
the trend of real domestic activity or it stems from other factors is a question to which we return. 
3) Public Sector Deficit 
While in 1990, the fiscal deficit was negligible, it increased to 5% of the GDP in 1991, and 
continued to rise (to 7% of the GDP) in 1992. This is a dangerous trend indeed, but its reasons 
are often misinterpreted. It is often claimed that the reason for the growing deficit is that the state 
still spends too much, implying that sizable improvements can be achieved by further cuts in total 
expenditures. In our view, this is not the case. Very significant cuts have been executed up to 
date, but the deficit has increased. Therefore it is of utmost importance to correctly evaluate the 
reasons of the increase in the public deficit.14 
According to our interpretation, the rise in public deficit, and the accompanying rapid 
growth in domestic public debt, is simply the reverse side of the improvement in the external 
payments, and the reduction of the net international indebtedness, of the country. This is the case 
because the factors that had the most powerful impact on the correction of external imbalances, 
were more or less the same as those that contributed to the increase in domestic imbalances, 
most notably the rise in public deficits. The two most important among these factors were: first, 
the switch-over to dollar payments in, combined with the collapse of, Eastern trade, and second, 
the recession in the domestic economy. 
The first factor needs some explanation. Energy and raw materials were relatively under-
priced in CMEA transactions on the one hand, and the domestic (i.e. Hungarian) cross-exchange 
rate between the transferable rouble (TR) and the US dollar significantly undervalued the TR 
relative to the official TR/USD exchange rate in Moscow, on the other. At the same time, the 
domestic price of energy and raw materials was close to world price levels in Hungary (already 
since the early 80`s). The difference between the import price and the domestic price was 
collected as tax; this was a significant source of net revenue for the state. With the switch to 
convertible payments and the use of world market prices in trade with the former CMEA 
countries, this source of state revenue was totally lost.15 But the reader is reminded that the 
                                                 
14 In the present analysis we do not make a distinction between the central government and the public sector 
balance. In 1991, the former was larger, in 1992, it was smaller than the latter. Our points relate both to the budget 
of the central government and to public finace in general. 
15 In 1990, the last year of the transferable rouble payments system, this revenue amounted to about 50 billion 
forints or 2.5 % relative to Hungarian GDP in that year. Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 
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collapse of this trade (partly induced by the switch to dollar payments and to the use of world 
market prices) had a significant impact on the growth of exports to Western countries. 
The other factor contributing to the increase in public deficits was domestic recession. The 
fall in incomes resulted in the contraction of the tax base and in the very rapid increase of public 
expenditures related to unemployment benefits and social outlays. The growth of public deficits 
in such a situation was more or less inevitable. But again, as analyzed, the recession was the other 
factor that forced domestic companies to increase their exports, and it was this factor that led to 
the smaller (than otherwise) increase of imports and, indirectly, helped the improvement of the 
current account and the foreign debt position of the country. 
Having said this, it is should be noted that the growth of the public sector deficit in 
Hungary, just as in other transition economies, is not likely to be a simple cyclical phenomenon, 
i.e. something that would just disappear if the economy starts to grow. This forecast may be 
supported by several explanations, but let us point out one major reason: privatisation, the 
growth of the non-official (dark) sector and the accompanying fall in the share of the state in the 
ownership of assets.  
The state-owned companies certainly did not (and still do not) function very efficiently, but 
they at least paid taxes. Privatisation, however, seems to imply the growth in the propensity for 
tax evasion. This is a phenomenon that will be attacked by the tax authorities, but all realistic 
forecasts should take this fact into consideration when contemplating on the prospects of the 
public sector deficit. Also, partly because of the high tax rates, several activities try to avoid 
official registration (mainly in retail trade, but there are other examples as well). They hide: 
although they may contribute to the GDP, their activity does not show up in the tax base.  
The other aspect of this issue is related to the question, whether the growth of public 
deficits was (or is) detrimental for the transition economies in general, and for Hungary in 
particular. Our answer is the negative. Had the government not spent the increased savings of 
households (to which we immediately return), these savings would not have been used for private 
investments. The reason is that real (loan) interest rates for companies were extremely high, but 
not because of the public deficit. They were high because of the bad portfolios of banks and 
because of the high risks associated with lending. Serious companies did not (do not) take credits 
at the extremely high real interest rates, and those companies that wish to do so, are not likely to 
be considered as serious (solvent) by commercial banks. This is a kind of trap, but, in our view, 
this trap is not the result of public deficits. On the contrary and seemingly paradoxically, it may 
have been the public deficit that contributed to the spending of the use of savings and, therefore, 
avoiding an even deeper recession. This is not to praise public sector deficits as such, but rather 
to point out the fact that in the transition period ideologically driven recommendations - such as 
the need for the immediate cut of public deficits due to their "crowding-out" effects - may simply 
turn out to be irrelevant. 
A further point needs to be emphsized. In 1992, the primary (non-interest) deficit of the 
public sector was negligible; it made up only 1.5 % of the GDP. The bulk of the deficit is related 
to interest payments on domestic public debt and - via interest payments to the Central Bank - on 
foreign debt. The expansion of interest payments is so rapid, that their growth cannot be arrested 
by just cutting non-interest public expenditures. The economy has to start to grow; otherwise the 
interest part of goverment spending may get out of control. 
This is so because the public deficit also has an inherent dynamic component. If one 
distinguishes between the primary (non-interest) deficit on the one hand, and interest payments, 
on the other, it becomes clear that while non-interest government spending can be affected by   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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current fiscal policy, it has no effect on interest payments. The simple reason for this is that 
interest payments are determined by the rate of interest and by the stock of public debt. 
However, the public debt was accumulated by fiscal policy of the past. The current fiscal policy can 
affect the future interest burdens only. 
Table 1 shows the composition of the deficit and its source of financing.16 It is obvious 
that in contrast to the total deficit, the primary deficit remained stable in 1991 and 1992. The total 
deficit increased due to the rapid increase in the interest payments on the public debt held outside 
the central bank. Between 1989 and 1992 the new net central bank credits to the government 
always were less than the government's interest payments to the central bank. This implies that 
the public deficit was not financed by money creation.17 However, in the meantime the public 
debt grew rapidly. This was caused by the deficit and by some measures of the government not 
related to the deficit directly (for example "bank consolidation", i.e. changing bad loans of the 
state owned commercial banks for governments bonds). 
Table 1: The central government deficit in Hungary and sources of its financing 
                                   1989   1990   1991   1992 
Central government deficit*        -0.3   -3.2    1.7    4 
    Primary deficit                -0.6   -3.4    1.4    1.5 
    Interest payments               0.2    0.3    0.4    2.5 
Source of financing 
    Seigniorage**                  -0.3   -3.3   -0.8   -1.7 
    Increase in public  
        debt due to deficit        -0.1    0.1    2.6    5.7 
 
*  Without interest payments between the central 
      government and the central bank 
** Net of interest payments between the central 
      government and the central bank 
 
In general, the speed of debt accumulation relative to GDP is determined by three 
components:18  
(1) the primary deficit relative to GDP,  
(2) the government revenue from money creation relative to GDP,  
(3) the difference between the real interest rate on the public debt and the real growth rate 
of the GDP.  
In Hungary the third factor plays the most important role in the debt accumulation 
process. The primary deficit is not very high and its ratio to GDP was relative stable. The table 1 
also shows that the deficit was not financed by money creation during the period 1989-1992. In 
contrast to these factors, the difference between the real interest rate and the real growth rate of 
                                                 
16 The total deficit reported in the table is less than the official figures. This is due to our accounting method. For 
simplicity we have subtracted the interest payments to the central bank from the new net central bank credits 
granted to the government.  
17 The sources of money creation during this period will be briefly described later. 
18 See Haliassos-Tobin(1990). Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 
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the GDP was around 10% in 1991 and 1992. This difference was mainly caused by the negative 
real growth rate since the real interest rate on public debt was not very high. 
The dynamic of the Hungarian public debt and deficit can be summarized in the following 
way: a relative small primary deficit financed by bonds today induces increased interest burdens 
and higher deficit tomorrow. Higher deficit requires new bond issue. In a growing economy the 
deficit can be financed by debt accumulation keeping both the public debt to GDP ratio and the 
public deficit to GDP ratio constant. However, this is not possible in a period of recession since 
the interest burden of the public debt is growing - inducing further debt accumulation. The 
dynamics of the interest burden makes it also impossible to continually offset the effects of the 
increasing interest payments by the reduction of the non interest government spending. The 
dynamics of the Hungarian public deficit can be characterized by exactly this process. Since the 
recession still continues, it seems unlikely that the Hungarian government can stop the increase 
of the public deficit in 1993 and 1994. The only tool available for the government, which could 
slow down the accumulation of the public debt in recession, is the revenues from money 
creation. Without real economic growth the fiscal crisis can hardly be solved. 
4) Savings 
Household savings increased dramatically in the period under review. Between 1990 and 
1992 the ratio of net savings to personal incomes grew from about 7.5 % to almost 19 %. 
Interestingly, the increase of the gross savings ratio (net savings plus net new credits to the 
household sector) increased much less. It went up from 11.5 % in 1990 to about 16.5 % in 1992. 
The major explanation of the discrepancy is that in this period, the household sector paid back 
old loans in a larger extent than it took new credits. 
Some part of the statistically recorded increase in the net savings rate may be due to 
inadequate accounting for inflation, but these problems can explain only a part, and, to be sure, 
only a small part of the increment in savings. The growth in the propensity to save was one of the 
most significant macroeconomic shifts in this period. This was the factor that enabled the 
government to both overspend (i.e. run public deficits) and improve the external balance of the 
economy. This increase in the savings ratio took place in a period characterised by high inflation 
and economic recession; therefore it needs some explanation. According to the most widespread 
interpretation, the major reason for the increase in the savings ratio is economic and political 
transformation proper, implying larger uncertainties concerning future incomes, employment 
etc.- calling for "reserves" for the future. According to an other explanation, the savings recorded 
as those of households are actually those of entrepreneurs, implying that these balances do not 
really constitute personal savings. Be it as it may, there was a significant increase of deposits and 
purchase of securities in this period, contributing not only to the improvement of the balance of 
payments and to the (indirect) financing the public deficit, but also to the fall in the rate of 
inflation 
5) Inflation  
The rate of inflation temporarily increased, and then decreased under the period under 
review. In 1990 the growth of consumer prices was almost 30 %; the rate went up to 35 % in 
1991, to be followed by a significant fall, to 23 % in 1992.  
Several reasons contributed to the favourable change in the trend of consumer price 
increases. An important one was the factor mentioned above, namely the rise of savings (fall of 
household expenditure). Relatively restrictive monetary policies also contributed to this result. 
Particularly important was the fact that in 1990-1991, but to some extent even in 1992, a real   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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revaluation of the domestic currency took place. This may have had an especially strong 
transitional effect on the decline of the inflation rate; we shall return to this point later.  
A peculiar feature of the disinflation process was that the decceleration of price increases 
turned out to be much more pronounced in the case of producer prices than consumer prices. 
Producer prices increased by 21% and 31.5 % in 1990 and 1991, respectively, followed by a drop 
to 13 % in 1992. Thus, after a significant initial gap (9 % points in 1990) between the consumer 
price index (CPI) and the producer price index (PPI) the gap decreased to 3.5 % points in 1991, 
but then jumped to 10 % points in 1992. This large and fluctuating discrepancy between the CPI 
and PPI can only partly be explained by the increase in VAT rates and the removal of subsidises. 
One further explanation is related to the possibility that price margins in both retail and 
wholesale trade have been rising rapidly; but even the inclusion of this factor is not likely to give a 
full economic justification of the observed gap. In our view, there may also be some problems of 
measurement with the PPI, but this is just a simple conjecture. The clarification of this point 
requires further analysis. 
There is no question that the fall in the rate of inflation was a major success in the years 
1990-92. However, in order to clarify whether or not this achievement is sustainable, we should 
take a look at some of the main components of economic policy mix applied in this period; 
analyse the stance of economic policy and the present problems and prospects of the Hungarian 
macroeconomy. 
B) Economic Policies 
Some of the most significant characteristics and components of macroeconomic policies in 
1990-92 have already been discussed or at least hinted on already. However, a more systematic 
discussion of the main features of macroeconomic management is necessary to reveal the role of 
policy measures on actual developments, and to clarify, in which respects there may be a need for 
corrections in economic policies. In what follows we concentrate on monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy, since these are the aspects of macroeconomic management that are most 
often mis understood or misinterpreted.  
Monetary policy was, generally speaking, rather restrictive in the early 1990`s. This 
statement holds in spite of the fact that there is quite a lot of discussion in Hungary on the 
criteria to be used for evaluating the stance of monetary policy in the particular context of a 
transition economy. We do not wish to go into the details of this discussion; we simply note the 
fact that although the growth of broad money was faster than that of nominal GDP, real interest 
rates surged, the rate of inflation fell and the balance of payments improved significantly. These 
simultaneous phenomena indicate that in the period of major structural and institutional changes 
it would make no sense to apply any kind of simple monetary rule. It is quite clear that the 
demand for money, partly due to the practical elimination of domestic shortages (i.e. economic 
agents do not wish to get rid of money as soon as possible), partly as a result of the rapid growth 
in the number of economic agents (companies), increased very significantly. Thus, according to 
the perception of economic agents, monetary policy was restrictive and their judgement is borne 
out by macroeconomic developments. 
Without (relatively) restrictive monetary policy, it would have been impossible to achieve 
the improvement in the balance of payments and in the net debt position, as well as to contain 
inflationary trends. However, the same policy measures that are likely to have contributed to 
these favourable trends, may also have had a part in the recession of the economy. It should be 
emphasized that this is not a definitive statement; it simply expresses a strong probability. Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 
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True, in 1992, monetary policy changed. The central bank tried to implement a kind of 
growth enhancing monetary policy. To increase the loan supply of the commercial banks, the 
central bank reduced the interest rate on central bank credits. The effects of this efforts could be 
easily observed on the treasury bill market. Figure 1 shows that the nominal yield on treasury 
bills fell rapidly. Since the inflation also decreased in the meantime, the real yield started to fall at 
the middle of 1992 only. Nevertheless, the central bank succeded in pushing down both the 
nominal and the real interest yield on treasury bills. This policy resulted in negative real return on 
treasury bills at the end of the year. 
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Figure 3: Nominal interest rate on long term loans and deposits (more than 1 year), 1989-93 Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 







Figure 4: Real interest rate, 1990-93 (nominal rate deflated by CPI): 
    - above - on short term loans and deposits (less than 1 year) 
    - below - on long term loans and deposits (more than 1 year).   Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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in the way expected by the central bank. As Figure 2 and 3 show, the nominal interest rate both 
on deposits and loans increased. However, the deposit rate fell more quickly than the loan rate. 
At the last quarter of 1992 the real deposit rate became negative (see Figure 4). The attempt of 
the central bank to stimulate credit supply turned out to be unsuccessful. While the decreasing 
deposit rate was accompanied by a decreasing saving rate, the decrease in the loan rate did not 
induce an increase in the amount of loans to the business sector. At the middle of 1993, it 
became clear that the expansive monetary policy could not increase considerably the credit supply 
of the commercial banks, while the saving rate fell dramatically. Trying to stop the negative 
tendencies in savings, the central bank started to increase the interest rate. It means that a relative 
tight monetary policy returned. 
Having described the events of 1992-93, the question necessarily arises why was the relative 
expansive monetary policy unsuccessful. Among other factors the overall uncertainty 
characterising the economy needs special emphasis.19 This means that even if relative cheap 
founds are available, the commercial banks are not eager to lend because the high risk of default 
enterprises are faceing. Figure 3 & 4 show that a considerable increase in the wedge between 
loan rate and deposit rate could be observed in 1992, but Table 2 shows that the effective 
reserve ratio has decreased during this period. This phenomenon can be mainly explained by the 
increasing uncertainty banks have to cope with, but also with the increasing amount of bad loans 
they have in their portfolios. Another phenomenon can be observed in Table 3. In 1992 the 
central bank reduced the interest rate on its loans, but commercial banks reacted in the opposite 
direction to this policy as one would have expected: they decreased their liabilities to the founds 
available from the central bank. 
Table 2: Effective reserve ratio. 
                                   1989   1990   1991   1992 
Effective reserve ratio in % 
   (Monetary base-Cash)/(M2-Cash)  18.8   21.3   31.4   27.1 
 
Table 3: Money creation net of interest payments in % of GDP 
 
                                   1989   1990   1991   1992 
Seigniorage created                 2.1    2.8    5.1    2.6 
Seigniorage used 
 Change in net foreign assets       6.2    2.1    5.9    8.8 
 Change in loans to the government  1.5   -2.1   -2.7   -0.1 
 Change in loans to the banks      -0.6    0.3   -0.2   -6.2 
 Other items                       -5.0    2.4    2.1    0 
 
The implication of the Hungarian experience in 1992-93 is that during the transition period 
the supply of loans to the business sector, and hence economic growth, can hardly be stimulated 
only by monetary policy instruments, because the commercial banks experience extemely high 
risks. 
                                                 
19 See for detailed analysis Valentinyi(1993). Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 
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A subset of monetary policy that may have particular relevance in explaining the trends in 
the past few years is exchange rate policy. In the foregoing discussion several allusions have been 
made to our perception of what should (and/or should not) have been done by means of 
exchange rate policy; it is time to formulate our critique more explicitly. According to several 
indicators of real exchange rate changes (domestic price and/or cost increases relative to partner 
countries corrected for - deflated by - average, so-called effective, nominal exchange rate changes 
vs. partner countries), the price and cost increases in Hungary have not been counterbalanced by 
nominal devaluations. This lead to the real appreciation of the Hungarian currency (see Figure 
5), with rather unfavourable effects on the prospects of both exports and domestic activities 
competing with imports. As already mentioned, it did have a positive impact on disinflation, but 
the balance of the costs and benefits (in terms of declining international cost and price 
competitiveness vs lower inflation) seems to indicate that the costs are very heavy - a marked loss 
of market shares in the domestic economy and declining price and cost competitiveness in 
international markets.  
 
Figure 5: The real effective exchange rate of the HUF (1985=100) 
We shall not discuss the features of fiscal policy, as its main constraints and characteristics 
have already been discussed. Instead, we turn to the macroeconomic prospects of the Hungarian 
economy and make some concluding remarks on the performance of this economy relative to 
that of other transition countries. 
V. The Outlook and Some Concluding Remarks on Hungary`s 
Comparative Performance.  
The macroeconomic outlook of the Hungarian economy is far from being encouraging. 
There are several signs indicating further depression or even the fall of economic activity. Among 
these signs the most important is the significant (25 %) drop in exports together with a 2 % 
growth in imports, resulting in a 2.3 billion USD deficit of the trade balance in Januar-August of 
1993. Inflation increased and the public sector deficit is also likely to rise.    Macroeconomic Policy, Liberalization...
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The macroeconomic difficulties analyzed in our study will most probably remain; we do 
not foresee any kind of rapid improvement, but rather expect that the large successes (e.g. in the 
external sector and inflation) may very easily be reversed. (The statistics for the first half of 1993 
indicate a deficit of 1.8 GDP in the current account.) 
This is a sad conclusion, but does it imply that the reason for the prospective economic 
problems of the country lie in the strategy chosen by economic policy? Is gradualism to be 
blamed for the present and future economic problems of the country? Or is the Hungarian 
privatization strategy, also involving a step-by-step approach, responsible for the macroeconomic 
difficulties? Our answer to these questions is definitively the negative.  
Four points have to be made in conclusion in order to support this judgment. First, the 
Hungarian privatization fared no worse than those of other CEE countries. Second, the countries 
having chosen - or having been forced to chose - a shock therapy are stil not in a better 
macroeconomic position than Hungary, and their prospects are also uncertain. Third, the policy 
problems in Hungary, referred to above (e.g. exchange rate policy) derive mainly from the lack of 
adequate cushions, ie. compensation for those profound exogenous macroeconomic and 
institutional shocks that resulted from the swich-over to dollar payments in, and the total collapse 
of, trade with the former CMEA countries. Finally, the present and future problems of the 
Hungarian economy may have to do with a fact beyond the focus of our study: economic policies 
neglected the fundamental task of continuous building of new institutions, coordinating systems, 
that is, the infrastructure of the market economy. 
As for privatization, an issue deliberately ignored in this paper, there are no signs that in 
any of the other CEE economies this problem would (or could) be handled with more efficiency 
or care than in Hungary. This does not, of course, imply that privatisation in Hungary goes well 
and there is nothing to improve on the actual procedures and techniques of privatisation. But it 
does imply that other CEE countries having decided to pursue a fundamentally different 
privatization strategy - i.e. "mass privatization" - have not as yet proved the superiority of their 
alternative strategy. It also supports our initial notion that the issue of privatization is secondary 
from the point of view of macroeconomic developments. 
The comparison with other CEE countries` performance is not easy because of differences 
in the statistical coverage and several other reasons related to the initial economic conditions of 
the countries concerned. Still, it is safe to state that most CEE countries, including Poland and 
the former CSFR (those that are the most relevant from the point of view of comparison) have 
yet to apply several legislative acts (i.e. the bankruptcy law) that already work in Hungary (with all 
their prospective negative effects on economic performance). The improvement in industrial 
production in Poland, generally considered as a clear indication of an (upward) turn in economic 
activity, followed a much deeper recession than what was experienced in Hungary and involves 
some macroeconomic paradoxes. It is still not clear from the macroeconomic accounts of this 
country, where the statistically recorded growth went to. As for the former Czechoslovakia, the 
macroeconomic puzzles are even more difficult to resolve, since here the significant decline in 
GDP and industrial production in 1992 is combined with falling unemployment rate, improving 
public sector balance and a decrease in inflation. If the macroeconomic statistics are correct, the 
tensions are likely to be found in the balance sheets of the banks and in inter-enterprise arrears 
(non-payments); but these hidden problems will show up sooner or later. They are likely to 
influence the stance and the prospects of public finance, quite apart from the specific problems 
related to the separation of the two parts of the former Czechoslovakia. Gábor Oblath  &  Ákos Valentinyi 
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As for the policy mistakes made in Hungary, there are several excuses, including that this 
country was the first in introducing not just fundamental reforms but in attempting to profoundly 
change its economic system; this may certainly explain some or most of the errors of economic 
policy. Whether or not this explanation is accepted by the public is a question to be answered at 
the next general elections due in 1994. 
Let us conclude with a personal statement. Though we are far from being enthusiastic with 
the activity and overall performance of the present Hungarian government, in our view, the 
gradualist approach to economic transition was a sound decision in Hungary. Had the 
government opted for a "shock therapy", the macroeconomic problems would be deeper with the 
prospects for recovery even more slim than nowadays. 
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